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University of Edinburgh 
 
I 
As regards a novelist’s approach to his or her work, that is, the method of writing or 
process of creation of a work, there seem to be two classes of novelists: on the one 
hand, those who form a more or less clear plan of their novels in advance of their 
writing them and then execute their plan in the course of it; and, on the other hand, 
those who devise no such plan and work not on the basis of any great number of 
preconceived ideas, but, rather, proceed irregularly, as Samuel Richardson put it in 
1751. The former, he wrote, conceive ‘an agreeable plan, write within its circle, and 
go on step by step with delight, knowing what they drive at. Execution is all they have 
to concern themselves about’ (Richardson quoted by Allott 1959: 144). The latter, 
with whom Richardson aligned himself, have no such plan, know not (or not entirely) 
what they drive at and proceed rather errantly, feeling about in the darkness that 
envelops them, so to speak.  
Amongst this latter class of writer is the contemporary Spanish novelist Javier 
Marías, widely acknowledged as one of the finest living writers worldwide, who on 
repeated occasions has explained that he has no interest in knowing in advance what 
his novels will be about. As he expounds in a short but revealing piece entitled 
‘Roving with a Compass’ (‘Errar con brújula’, also translatable as ‘Erring with a 
Compass’), he lacks a vision of the future and an aim: 
 
Not only do I not know what I want to write, nor where I would like to 
get to, nor do I have a narrative project that I can formulate before or 
after my novels have come to exist, but I do not even know, when I 
begin one, what it will be about or what will happen in it, or how many 
characters there will be, not to mention how it will end […] The truth 
of the matter is that nowadays I still continue to write without much 
purpose and without an objective worth mentioning (Marías 1993: 91). 
 
There are writers, he adds, who know from the outset what they want their text to be 
like and what they will write about; they are novelists who ‘work with a map, and 
before setting out are already familiar with the territory they have to traverse: they 
confine themselves to covering this ground, secure in the knowledge of possessing the 
means by which they are to do so’ (Marías 1993: 92). On the rare occasion when 
Marías has seen the route in advance, in the case of the odd short story, he has 
admitted to having the feeling of merely transcribing, writing out something, and he 
has found this tiresome (Marías 1993: 92). That is why he prefers, instead, to work 
with a compass, as he puts it:  
 
Not only do I not know what my purpose is and what I would like to or 
will write about on each occasion, but I am also entirely ignorant of the 
representation, to employ a term that can encompass both what one 
calls ‘plot’, ‘storyline’ or ‘story’ and its formal, stylistic, or rhythmical 
appearance, as well as its structure (1993: 92). 
 
Moreover, writing blindly or in the dark (‘escribir a tientas’) and this ‘not 
knowing’ (‘no saber’) allow him to install himself in digressiveness or errancy 
(‘errabundia’), something that critics frown upon, according to Marías, ‘granting great 
importance to what is ‘pertinent’ or ‘essential’ to the story, as if everything that 
appears in a narrative should be useful information and directed at one and the same 
end’ (Marías 1993: 92-3).1 Furthermore, as he has said elsewhere, ‘sometimes in 
literature as in life, one does not know what is part of a story until the story takes 
shape and is complete and finished’ (Marías 2008: 125). This makes eminent sense: 
unless one is already in possession of all the facts, of the whole story, before actually 
writing the story, how can one know what will turn out to be related (to it) and what 
not? As Marías puts it, Cervantes, Sterne, Proust, Nabokov, Bernhard or Benet ‘have 
been masters of this errancy of texts or of the art of drifting, digression, the aside, the 
lyrical interpolation,  the prolonged and autonomous affront and metaphor, 
respectively’; however, it cannot be said, he adds in defence of digression in 
literature, that this tendency is gratuitous in any of their cases, or that it is not 
pertinent or essential to the story; what is more, it is precisely such digressive 
dispositions that actually make narrative possible in each case (Marías 1993: 93). And 
he concludes, with reference to the novel he had just finished at the time, A Heart So 
White (1992), that the reason he found out what this novel of his was about –– but 
only after he had completed it –– was that,  
 
                                                 
1 Marías is probably thinking here of Spanish critics, though there also seems to be a tradition of 
disregard for the digressive and episodic element in English literature, the most notable and extreme 
example perhaps being Anthony Trollope’s assertion that ‘there should be no episodes in a novel. 
Every sentence, every word, through all those pages, should tend to the telling of the story. Such 
episodes distract the attention of the reader, and always do so disagreeably’ (Trollope quoted by Allott 
1959: 233). Apart from Sterne, as Judith Hawley reminds us in her essay in the present book, and also 
Cervantes, Fielding, too, seems regularly to have attracted much criticism, notably for the episode of 
‘The Man of the Hill’ in The History of Tom Jones (for instances of such criticism, see Allott 1959: 
227-55). 
as happens when reading the authors mentioned, whilst I was writing I 
found myself obliged to stop due to an aside, a digression or an 
interpolation: my interest as a writer is not very different to my interest 
as a reader: as such, I want to be forced to stop and think, and as long 
as this is the case I don’t really mind what story I am being told. At the 
end of the day, what is narratable in a novel is only what can also be 
said in a few and interchangeable words. Novels, however, tend to 
consist of many words and precisely these are not interchangeable 
(Marías 1993: 93; original italics). 
 
So, in the case of Marías, the significance of this errant process of creating a 
novel, this need to feel his way in the darkness that is the unmapped novel, to find his 
way in uncharted territory, is threefold: it sheds light on the processes of the creative 
imagination; it is this errant process that facilitates a formal digressivenes, a 
digressive style of writing;
2
 and it is ultimately related to the freedom of the novel per 
se.  
If a work is already complete before being written, before being created in 
written language, then written language and the imaginative and inventive processes 
                                                 
2 If Marías’s work is begun without premeditation and ‘becomes’ as he writes, then this is also true of 
his style –– that is, it also applies at the level of his sentence –– which is a ‘loose style’ of writing very 
much along the lines described by Morris Croll in his study of the Baroque style in prose (in Sir 
Thomas Browne and other seventeenth-century writers): ‘Its purpose is to express, as far as may be, the 
order in which an idea presents itself when it is first experienced. It begins, therefore, without 
premeditation, stating its idea in the first form that occurs; the second member is determined by the 
situation in which the mind finds itself after the first has been spoken; and so on throughout the period, 
each member being an emergency of the situation. The period –– in theory, at least –– is not made; it 
becomes. It completes and takes on form in the course of the motion of the mind which it expresses’ 
(Croll 1972: 111; my italics). And it is the movements of such a mind that we are invited to follow as 
readers, more than the realities presented or the topic at hand; the primary focus of such an errant, 
‘loose’ and ‘free’ prose style will always be on the course of the motion of the mind perceiving the 
world. For reasons of space, I cannot elaborate on this intricate way in which style and creative 




 Instead, through the method or approach adopted, the process of 
the novel’s unfolding, its becoming whilst he writes, is what ensues and what appeals 
to Marías (Marías 1989: 26). The work cannot be preconceived, planned or forecast –
– it can only become. What this errant process allows him to do –– by resisting a 
mapping of the way, a plotting of the work, an imposition of a structure in advance 
and by preferring the uncertainty of not knowing what it will be about –– is to 
suppress a natural human tendency to impose pattern that, according to Anton 
Ehrenzweig’s study of the psychology of the creative imagination, is so detrimental to 
the creative effort; this errancy thus breaks what Ehrenzweig calls the ‘pernicious rule 
of preconceived design’ (1967: 49).  
As he says in his discussion of the functioning of the creative ego and the role, 
within that, of the differentiated and undifferentiated modes in the creative search (for 
an image or an idea), such a search involves the scrutiny of ‘an astronomical number 
of possibilites’, and the correct choice cannot be made ‘by a conscious weighing up of 
each single possibility’; ‘if we could map out the entire way ahead, no further search 
would be needed. As it is, the creative thinker has to make a decision about his route 
without having the full information needed for his choice’ (Ehrenzweig1967: 35-7). 
This is a dilemma, he adds, that belongs to the essence of creativity. Marías’s errant 
writing process flows in just this way, abandoning exact visualization or mapping, 
since that would only lead one entirely astray (Ehrenzweig 1967: 36). This errant 
operation effects just what Ehrenzweig says is necessary in the creative process: the 
                                                 
3 As Maurice Blanchot put it once, ‘if the work is already present in its entirety in the writer’s mind and 
if this presence is what is the essence of the work (the words being here considered as inessential), then 
why should there be, any longer, a need for him to produce it? Either the work is, as an interior project, 
all that it will ever be, and the writer, from that moment onwards, knows everything he can ever hope 
to learn from it and will let it lie in its twilight, without translating it into words, without writing it –– 
but then he will not write it, he will not be a writer; or, becoming aware that the work cannot be 
projected but only realised, that it has no value, no truth and reality othar than through the words that 
develop it in time and inscribe it in space, he will set to writing it, but starting at nothing and with a 
view to nothing –– and, paraphrasing Hegel, like a nothingness working in nothingness’ (Blanchot 
1949: 296). 
‘clouding’ of consciousness in order to make the right decision (1967: 38). This 
points to the ‘yielding’ of reason that is necessary in the work of the creative 
imagination, a way of ascertaining that reason does not constrain the imagination, 
because it is ‘a bad thing and detrimental to the creative work of the mind if Reason 
makes too close an examination of the ideas as they come pouring in –– at the very 
gateway as it were’, as Freud affirms in The Interpretation of Dreams by quoting 
Friedrich Schiller (1976: 177).
4
  
The errant method of Marías allows him to ‘move and make interim decisions 
without being able to visualize the precise relationship with the end product’, which, 
according to Ehrenzweig, is exactly what the creative artist has to do (1967: 47). Each 
stage of the process imposes new choices and decisions that could not have been 
foreseen at an earlier stage; it is not that the writer is unconcerned about the effect of 
the interim decisions taken on the end product or about the final outcome as a whole; 
it is just that ‘he must be able to bear the suspense’ (Ehrenzweig 1967: 48).  
Marías’s errant way of proceeding enables him to do just that. The value of the 
interim choices, the motifs, fragments, episodes or digressions pursued, the value of 
every element opted for, is discovered errantly in the (digressive) process of writing 
and is only revealed at the end, when everything gradually becomes associated and 
acquires significance as part of an interrelated whole (even if the literary work can 
never really be wholly and properly elucidated); the structure has to be imperfect and 
the artist needs to resist the ‘law of closure’ that will strive to ‘round off the work 
                                                 
4 It has long been argued that the workings of the imagination are based, to a significant extent, on 
unconscious, inspired, intuitive, dream-like, spontaneous, or other, analogous processes of association 
that make it a unifying force; these processes of association are not generally deemed to be governed 
by the intellect, reason or the conscious mind and the imagination is therefore taken to operate, to a 
certain degree, independently of reason and rational, conscious thought; hence, the imagination entails 
freedom (from practical considerations and purpose) and is determined in the act of perception and free 
in aesthetic creativity, as Kant sought to demonstrate (see Kant 1924, especially section 43; see also 
Starobinski 1970, for an overview). 
prematurely’.5 The errant method in particular is very well suited to preventing such 
closure, and allowing the writer to work with the incoherent fragment, the disruptive 
form element –– what is a digression if not precisely such a disruptive form element 
in writing? –– since, not least, such disruptive, unruly devices break hold of mannered 
formulae and stem the rush to predetermined solutions (Ehrenzweig 1967: 48-53). 
Too deliberate a handling of elements would be detrimental for the creative process 
and there is a real need to frustrate preconceived intentions and an over-precise 
visualization, says Ehrenzweig (1967: 56), something which Marías’s creative errancy 
and his digressiveness permit him to achieve fairly ‘naturally’, since this way of 
proceeding is part of the normal technique employed, his way of writing, a method 
that allows the mature artist that is Marías to keep his intentions flexible enough, and 
it is also ‘natural’, for that matter, in that the digressive mode appears to be no less 
than the mind’s primary, inherent, instinctive, spontaneous way of operating.6 
                                                 
5 ‘The ‘law of closure’ postulated by the gestalt theory will always tend to round off and simplify the 
images and concepts of conscious thought. It makes it difficult, if not impossible, for rational thought 
to handle ‘open’ material without rounding it off prematurely. A second revision will tend to impart to 
such material a greater precision and compactness than it actually possesses. This can lead to wrong 
results’ (Ehrenzweig 1967: 39). In a sense, the errant processes and the digressive form of the writing 
naturally, that is, through their very nature, by diverting attention through the accidental or to the 
seemingly insignificant detail, say, tend to disrupt and destroy ‘the good gestalt’ of the material and 
stem the processes of secondary revision or elaboration, thus allowing for an exploration of the 
complexities radiating across the work. 
6 On the one hand, digression represents a continuity of thought through the processes of association 
that lead from one element to the next, whether by way of contiguity or resemblance between the 
elements, as Pierre Bayard concludes in his study of digression in Proust (Bayard 1996: 23). But, as 
Bayard also suggests, it is reasonable to assume that the natural tendency of the mind is to create such 
links in general (Bayard 1996: 124); and this is substantiated time and again in studies of digression 
and the processes of association. This is why, for example, Ross Chambers speaks of the ‘naturalness 
of  loiterature’, maintaining, for instance, that a digressive style of writing ‘seems somehow natural –– 
or at least more natural than disciplined argument or the tightly controlled narratives that we 
nevertheless tend to get so caught up in. It’s more in tune with the complexity of things and the tangled 
relations that join them’ (1999: 31; original italics). And Arthur Koestler, in his fascinating study of the 
creative process, explains that conscious controls and reason are necessary to maintain the disciplined 
routines of thought but that they become an impediment to creativity because they block more 
primitive and natural levels of mental organization and functioning, which are digressive (1964); 
‘during strenuous effort to concentrate’, he says,  ‘one seems literally to ‘feel’ inside one’s head the 
expenditure of energy needed to suppress diversional thoughts which keep popping up like jacks-in-
the-box’, and he goes on to quote the Scottish scientist James Clerk Maxwell, who once remarked that 
‘ “A great part of our fatigue often arises, not from those mental efforts by which we obtain the mastery 
of the subject, but from those which are spent in recalling our wandering thoughts” ’; all this seems to 
The creative errancy and the concomitant formal digressiveness (the 
digressiveness of the form, of his writing, that is) provide Marías with the (welcome) 
‘accident-inviting’ means necessary, according to Ehrenzweig, to disrupt the flexible 
planning of the artist, in the conversation between the writer and the medium that the 
process of creation and writing can become, especially in the case of a mature artist 
(who will be less inclined to view the unruly element as unwelcome); ‘true 
craftsmanship does not impose its will on the medium but explores its varying 
responses’ in the coversation between equals that the process of creation thus 
develops into (Ehrenzweig 1967: 58). An excessive preoccupation with pattern, 
structure or plot, with an individual element, episode, even an aside or digression and 
a need for fully conscious control of the medium would blind the writer to the 
transformations taking place as all the various elements coming to make up the work 
evolve into a more complex total structure, a growth that cannot be foreseen or 
predicted in any way from the nature of the particular. The number of possible 
choices open to the artist are not limited in the creative work, unlike in a game played 
in which choices are limited strictly by the rules of that particular game; there are no 
limiting rules in creative work, argues Ehrenzweig, since the work, as Marías shows, 







                                                                                                                                            
indicate that these are ‘our preferential matrices of ideation’, concludes Koestler, that is, in lay terms, 
that this is our natural, uninhibited way of thinking (Koestler 1964: 645-6). 
 This is particularly so in the case of Javier Marías’s Dark Back of Time [Negra 
espalda del tiempo] (1998). Presented by the author as a ‘false novel’, it seems to 
have created its own rules that have allowed it to take the ‘irregular’ form it has. That 
is one of the reasons why Marías called it a ‘false novel’, because it is not to be 
construed as a novel in the mould of previous ones. 
A generically errant text, part-memoir, part-biographical narrative, part-essay, 
with an element of fiction, Dark Back of Time proposes or pretends –– as the first-
person narrator, who bears the name ‘Javier Marías’ and appears to be the author 
himself (in as far as narrator and author of a literary work can be ‘the same’), explains 
in the opening section or chapter –– to  
 
tell what happened, or was ascertained or simply known –– what 
happened in my experience or in my fabulation or in my knowledge –– 
or perhaps all of it is only consciousness that never ceases –– as a 





The novel referred to here is Marías’s All Souls [Todas las almas] (1989), set in 
Oxford and inspired by, and drawing on, Marías’s own experiences in the city where 
he worked as Lector in the Sub-Faculty of Spanish at the University in the early 
1980s. It was read by many as a roman à clef, and fiction and reality were often 
conflated to such an extent that the fiction ended up having a considerable effect on 
the empirical reality of the author, which is what he sets out to recount in Dark Back 
                                                 
7 Most subsequent quotations are of this 2001 English translation of the novel, unless I have provided 
my own for the purposes of greater precision. 
of Time. And he proposed to do this, despite the profound distrust of certainty that all 
of Marías’s narratives evince and the extreme scepticism regarding the possibility of 
representing the world through writing that is expressed in the first two pages of Dark 
Back of Time:  
 
Language can’t reproduce events and shouldn’t attempt to […] Words 
–– even when spoken, even at their crudest –– are in and of themselves 
metaphorical and therefore imprecise, and cannot be imagined without 
ornament, though it is often involuntary […] Fiction creeps into the 
narration of what happened, altering or falsifying it. The time-
honoured aspiration of any chronicler or survivor –– to tell what 
happened, give an account of what took place […] –– is, in fact, a mere 
illusion or chimera, or, rather, the phrase and concept themselves are 
already metaphorical and partake of fiction. ‘To tell what happened’ is 
inconceivable and futile, or possible only as invention. The idea of 
testimony is also futile and there has never been a witness who could 
truly fulfill his duty (8). 
 
This notwithstanding, Marías places himself in Dark Back of Time ‘on the side of 
those who have sometimes claimed to be telling what really happened or pretended to 
succeed in doing so’ (8).  
But he does his telling through an errant creative process and a digressive 
form. His narrative holds for him ‘the diversion of risk, the risk of narrating 
something for no reason and in almost no order, without making an outline or trying 
to be coherent’ (9). His story is profoundly digressive, so much so that this time he 
not only purports to wander without any compass in the process of its creation, but the 
story he discovers has no beginning nor any ending and may, indeed, not even be a 
story at all: 
 
The elements of the story I am now embarking upon are entirely 
capricious, determined by chance, merely episodic and cumulative –– 
all of them irrelevant by the elementary rule of criticism, none of them 
requiring any of the others –– because in the end no author is guiding 
them, though I am relating them; they correspond to no blueprint, they 
are steered by no compass, most of them are external in origin and 
devoid of intention and therefore have no reason to make any kind of 
sense or to constitute an argument or plot or answer to some hidden 
harmony, and no lesson should be extracted from them (nor should any 
such thing be sought from real novels; above all, the novels themselves 
should not want it) –– not even a story with its beginning and suspense 
and final silence. I don’t believe this is a story, though, not knowing 
how it ends, I may be mistaken. I do know that the beginning of this 
tale lies outside it, in a novel I wrote some time ago, or before that (in 
which case it’s even more amorphous), in the two years I spent as an 
impostor in the city of Oxford, teaching entertaining but on the whole 
quite useless subjects at its University […]. Its ending must also lie 
outside it, and will surely coincide with my own, some years from 
now, or so I hope. Or it may happen that the ending survives me (9-
10). 
 
It is true that both its beginning and ending lie outside of Dark Back of Time, and the 
work ends with the promise of more to come: ‘A great deal has yet to be told, some of 
it recent and some still to come, and I need time […] I am going to stop now and say 
no more for a while’ (335-6). It seems unlikely, though, that this promise will be kept, 
and, consequently, the tale remains fittingly imperfect. 
So, Dark Back of Time is not really a true novel, a true fiction (11), only a 
‘false’ one at best; it tells a story with no real ending or beginning, a story which, in 
truth, may not be a story at all, and attempts to recount what really happened, though 
the narrator acknowledges readily this is not possible. (Marías’s literature is governed 
by paradox.) As a matter of fact, at one point the narrator goes as far as admitting: ‘I 
don’t know what it is that I am doing nor why’.8 What, then, is he doing? Well, he 
speaks, ‘among other things, of several dead men, real ones’, among them the now 
obscure poet and former King of Redonda John Gawsworth (whose Kingdom Marías 
eventually reveals he has inherited), the ill-fated writer Wilfrid Ewart, killed by a 
stray bullet in Mexico, or the adventurer Hugh Oloff de Wet, men whom he never 
knew, ‘thereby becoming a kind of unexpected and distant posterity for them’, their 
‘memory’; ‘I will be their ghost’, he concludes (12). As a ghost, then, Marías 
proceeds to tell us of these ‘wanderer[s] into nothingness’ [‘errabundos hacia la 
nada’], as de Wet is described (284), and he does so appropriately digressively: ‘I 
must make a digression’, he announces at the very beginning of the fifth section, ‘–– 
this is a book of digressions, a book that proceeds by digression ––’, he immediately 
interpolates in a metanarrative echo of Tristram Shandy’s famous analysis of the two 
‘contrary motions’ of his art of writing (‘In a word, my work is digressive, and it is 
                                                 
8 Here, too, the English translation of the Spanish is a bit too vague for our purposes and I have slightly 
modified it (‘no sé qué es lo que estoy haciendo ni por qué lo hago’ is what is said [Marías 1998: 73]). 
progressive too, ––and at the same time’ [Sterne 1967: 95]).9 And he also tells of a 
particular conception of time, a time ‘that must be different for someone who began 
writing and reading in reverse’ (being left-handed, he started writing from right to left 
[300]), a perception of moving through ‘the other side of time, its dark back’, a time 
that has not existed, that awaits us and ‘also the time that does not await us and 
therefore does not happen, or happens only in a sphere that isn’t precisely temporal, a 
sphere in which writing, or perhaps only fiction, may –– who knows –– be found’, a 
time in which, also, ‘the living and the dead, can speak to each other and 
communicate’, the only dimension they have in common (301). 
Dark Back of Time, through its irregular nature, through the creative errancy 
and digressivenes it lays bare, is in many ways a fairly novel form that pays tribute to 
the genre of the novel, a celebration of the freedom of the form that is the novel, a 
freedom that characterizes some of the best novels in the history of the genre, from 
Cervantes’s Don Quixote or Persiles, through Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, to Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past. This freedom is directly related to their digressiveness. 
Javier Marías has said that Sterne’s work also taught him that ‘everything could be 
made to fit into this flexible genre called novel, provided it was done gracefully’ 
(2009). Dark Back of Time is indeed sui generis, generically and otherwise, and, to 
draw a parallel with an equally magnificently ‘irregular’ work from another continent 
and century, in formal terms very much like Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, in that 
                                                 
9 As it happens, the allusion to Sterne is not entirely accidental: Marías translated literature in English 
for many years (among others, prose texts by Sir Thomas Browne, Joseph Conrad, Isak Dinesen, 
Thomas Hardy, W. B. Yeats and poetry by Robert Louis Stevenson, Vladimir Nabokov, William 
Faulkner and John Ashbery),  and also Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy into Spanish (which won 
him Spain’s National Prize for Translation in 1979), and he has repeatedly declared that the latter is his 
favourite work and the work that has had the most profound influence on his own writing (mainly as a 
result of the act of ‘re-writing’ that translation represents), because, apart from Sterne being for Marías 
the most genuine inheritor of Cervantes (more so than any Spanish author), Sterne taught him ‘the 
freedom and daring’ of writing and how ‘to expand or delay time or, in other words, how to contrive to 
give existence in the novel to that time that in real life never has the time to exist’ (Marías 2009). 
 
Dark Back, too, is an ‘odd book, professing to be a novel; wantonly eccentric; 
outrageously bombastic; in places charmingly and vividly descriptive’, as was said of 
Melville’s work at the time.10 And just as Ishmael was said to be, the narrator Marías 
is carefully ‘careless about ‘narrative’, offhand about consistency, resistant to 
completion or closure’ (yes, ‘carefully careless’, the oxymoron must stand since the 
carelessness is, as we have had the occasion to observe, the result of a modus 
operandi), and ‘does not care to approach his writing task “methodically” ’, opting, 
instead, to wander with –– or even without –– a compass. And if Dark Back of Time is 
indeed ‘wild, unconnected, all episode’, digressive and lacking ‘cohesion’, as 
Melville’s work was described, even though it does ultimately show, like the most 
truly free and digressive novels, how everything in the world is interconnected in one 
way or another, then, like Melville’s work,11 Marías’s, too, is therefore no different to 
the world, and so, as the narrator of Dark Back of Time explains,  
 
if the reader should wonder what on earth is being recounted here or 
where this text is heading, the only proper answer, I fear, would be that 
it is simply running its course and heading toward its ending, just like 







                                                 
10 This is what one of the first reviewers of The Whale said, quoted by Tony Tanner in his 
‘Introduction’ to the Oxford World Classics edition of Moby Dick (in Melvile 1998: vii). 
11 See Tanner (in Melvile 1998: xxv-xxvi). 
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